

When “Nothing” Happened

Plenty of Guts, No Glory!

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Our Knowledge Sources

Information and cases are based on presenter's professional training and experience in medical, corporate and private practice settings. The ideas and techniques are also:

Best Practices and Training in Threat Assessment/Management

Generated From Hundreds of Actual Cases in Multiple Settings

Tactical and Behavioral Rather Than Diagnostic or Treatment Oriented

Supported in Threat Assessment Professional Practices From Forensic Research

Learning Objectives

Upon completion of this presentation, participants will:

- Understand the definition of a **“Threat”** and **subtypes**
- Learn the definitions of **Threat Assessment** and **Threat Management**
- Learn the meanings of certain Threat Assessment Terms
- Understand Consultation and Case Management in Threat Assessment Context
- Be provided with the elements of the **Pathway to Violence**
- Understand how a Security Committee and “SAT” Team Operate
- Hear some actual cases and outcomes

Learning Objectives (continued)

Upon completion of this presentation, participants will **NOT**:

- Be qualified to assess threats or manage them
- Be qualified to provide consultation to others involved in threatening situations
- Necessarily feel comfortable in troubling or threatening situations
- Be provided with all of the tools and knowledge of Threat Assessment

Threat Assessment & Threat Management

The Key Elements

Early Recognition ~ Accurate Assessment ~ Effective Management of threats of targeted violence by individuals or groups against individuals or groups



Association of Threat Assessment Professionals ~ ATAP

Mental Health Professionals ~ Law Enforcement ~ Security Professionals

Definitions: Threat Assessment Glossary

Bulling and Scalora, University of Nebraska

Threat Assessment

- A fact based method of assessment/ investigation that focuses on the pattern of an individual's thinking and behavior to determine whether or to what extent he or she is moving towards an attack on an identifiable target (Borum et al., 1999)

Threat Management

- Managing a subject's behavior through interventions and strategies designed to disrupt or prevent an act of targeted violence.

Threat Management Process

- The threat management process is the entirety of the steps taken to identify, assess, and manage a threat assessment case. This includes developing, implementing, and monitoring a thorough plan unique to each subject and situation that includes protective measures for the intended target.

(Fein et al., 1995, 2002)

Professionals Specializing in Threat Assessment/ Management

EA Professionals

Law Enforcement Professionals

Mental Health Chemical Dependency Professionals

- Clinical / Substance Abuse Counselors
- Clinical Social Workers
- Psychiatrists
- Psychologists

Occupational Health Professionals

Security Professionals

Threat Assessment Essentials

Early Recognition and Reporting

- proactive thinking is not widely practiced!
- “he just snapped”
- “we don’t know why...”

Accurate Assessment

- Experienced professionals, trained in Threat Assessment/Management
- Put your DSM V away, it won’t help!
- This isn’t CISM
- Fatal Error: waiting until violence is immanent

Effective Management

- No time limits on retribution
- Unprecedented is common denominator

Threat Assessment Priorities

1. Safety
2. Dignity for All
3. Duty to Warn
4. Observe, Monitor, Strategize

Why Don't We Ever Hear About “Success Stories?”

- No “Bleed” - No “Lead”: media wants ratings
- No One Wants To Risk Being Blamed Present or Future
- All those involved want problem to just “go away”

Wait.....What problem? “Nothing” Happened!

Origins of Violent Behaviors

- “Disgruntled” Employees
- Mentally Ill / Personality Disordered Employees
- Bullies
- Grievance Collectors: “greatly wronged”
- Domestic Violence Perpetrators
- Criminals: Monetary Gain, Retribution (gangs)
- Terrorists: Political, Ideological or Religious Motivations

Presenting Problem Clusters:

Underlying Conditions

Marital/ Relationship
Domestic Violence
Depression/ SI, HI
Addictions/ Abuse
CODEP
Personality Disorders

Parenting / Teen
Depression/ SI, HI
Addictions/ CODEP
PX / Sexual Abuse
Gang / Criminal

Stress / Anxiety
Depression / SI, HI
PTSD
Personality Disorder
Addiction/ Abuse
CODEP

Boss / Co-workers
Addictions/ Abuse
CODEP
Depression/ SI, HI
Personality Disorders

Legal / Financial
Gambling
Addictions/ Abuse
PTSD
Criminal

Elder Care
Elder Abuse
Depression / SI, HI
Grief / Loss
CODEP

Gender Identity
Depression / HI, SI
Bullying
Grief / Loss

Grief / Loss
Unresolved Previous Losses
Anniversary Reaction
Depression

Suicidal Ideation
Homicidal Ideation

What We Know About Violent People

- Most are **NOT** “mentally ill”
- Most leave a trail of **clues** in the early stages, go “covert” while preparing to act and even do rehearsals
- **LEAKAGE** is one of the most critical pre-event signs of impending violence
- Suicide and Homicide are **NOT** mutually exclusive
- **“Victim Switching”** is a strong possibility

Myths About Threat Assessment / Management

Meeting a demand is only reinforcing bad behavior

- Accommodation is sometimes necessary to avoid escalation

Threat Assessment Process can “Predict Violence”

- Threat Assessment is *Recognition of Elevated Risk*

Hearsay or “second hand” information is not significant

Domestic Violence is a personal issue, not a workplace concern

People just ‘snap’

Direct Threats must exist before intervention can occur

Threat Assessment Basic Competencies

Threat Assessment Professionals:

- Understand the RED FLAGS of Threats/Troubling Situations
- Can detect LEAKAGE in multimedia contexts
- Be able to articulate risk factors to others who have no knowledge of Threat Assessment
- Work within the legal structure; understand laws, privacy practices and duty to warn
- Do not attempt to apply mental health diagnostics in Threat Assessment
- Understand that situations and outcomes are all different
- Are prepared to work with unprecedented situations

Some 'Red Flags'

Leakage

Speaks of Suicide

Ideas of Persecution

'Score Card'

'Last Straw' Thinking

Racism, Misogyny

Substance / Process Abuse or Addictions

Threats written in a "polite language"

Delusional statements, beliefs, behaviors

Barriers to Reporting Threats

“If you see something, say something”

Fear of Blame, Labeling, Embarrassment or “Over Reacting”

Retaliation

- By management or by the “Threat” (violent person)

Denial

- Not my Job or Not my Problem mentality
- Silo Thinking
- Only Joking

Magical Thinking: “it will go away”

Reporting will result in over aggressive investigation and management

Pathway to Workplace Targeted or Intended Violence

Calhoun and Weston hypothesized a behavioral pattern in workplace violence:

1. The Grievance

2. Violent Ideation

3. Research and Planning an Attack

4. Pre-attack Preparation

5. Probing and (security) Breaches

decision

final acts

ATTACK

ESCALATION
DE-ESCALATION

From Calhoun, T. and Weston, R Hunters and Howlers

Protective Orders

They can help but can also make things worse

- May stop some people from violent behavior
- Could also escalate violence in desperate or enraged people
- Will allow Law Enforcement to arrest violators

33% of the time, Protective Orders will cause or escalate violent behaviors

Protective Orders are the most effective against non-violent perpetrators

Tools (Motorola EAP)

Integrated Model

Case Management Team

- For cases that may require higher intensity management, but have yet to show red flags

SAT

- Team Composition
- Training,
- Consensus Building

Escalation Model

Tools (Motorola EAP)

Six Step Consultation Model (Motorola EAP, 1992)

1. Define preliminary situation and desired goal(s)
2. Who are the partners (who is involved or needs to be)
3. Non judgmental specifics of the situation: is the goal realistic or panic driven?
4. Strategy Development
5. Alternative strategy development
6. Consensus driven plan and follow-up

Integration of EAP into a Security process

EAP has an important place in the protection of their client employees.

Involvement in a Security Committee or other violence prevention arrangement gives us a chance to demonstrate our worth to an organization.

- **We are more than the group that handles the “problem children.”**

We bring a behavioral health/social science perspective to any approach.

We must always remember to be as sensitive as possible to issues of confidentiality and the language of behavioral health.

Anatomy of a Security Committee

Any committee or group approach must be tailored to the make-up of your company.

- **Geography**
- **Type of business**
- **Customers**
- **Media exposure**
- **Internal business politics/business structure**

This is not just for larger corporations – any sized business can address security/violence issues in a more systematic way.

Make-up of a Security Committee

Legal

Medical

Benefits

Human Resources/Labor Relations

EAP

Make-up of a Security Committee

Met every other week over lunch (provided) on a Friday.

Mandatory attendance by someone representing every group. No excuses.

If someone absolutely could not be there, the meeting was canceled.

These above messages were “sent” with the intention of underlining the importance of what we did.

Make-up of a Security Committee

(Continued)

Separate data base accessed only by legal team. No one else in the company could access.

Notes for every case were entered into the data base by one of the attorneys.

Decisions were made by mutual consent only.

Only the final decision of the group was entered into the data base.

Disagreements, assignments, assessments, etc. were worked out during our every other Friday lunch meetings.

Types of Cases

Threats of violence of any kind.

- **Direct verbal threats.**
- **Psychotic behavior of any kind, especially behavior with violent undertones.**
- **Letters/email/packages.**
- **Stalking.**

Marketing of the Security Committee

Presentations were made to the department personnel about the nature of the Committee and how to access.

Presentations were made by representatives of the Committee to management at manufacturing/sales/logistics centers across the country.

The contracted EAP representatives at each of the above locations were made aware of how to use the Security Committee.

Access to the Security Committee

Cases came to the Security Committee through all of the departments and their channels.

All cases were considered and all cases were brought to the Committee, even if they did not rise to the level of a “case.”

However, all cases were documented and our suggestions and the resolutions were documented to protect us legally in the event of a lawsuit, incident, etc.

Professional Consultation

Met quarterly and later as budget's tightened, twice a year with Park Dietz from TAG (Threat Assessment Group) out of San Francisco. For consultation and additional training.

Budget came out of Human Resources to pay for training, his travel, etc.

We had access to Park 24/7, however this access was not inexpensive as he was on a retainer to 3M.

How Do We Know Prevention Occurred?

Nothing prevented, concerns are unfounded

May never know: intervention, interception, outside interference

Evidence of Lethal Plans or Preparations Discovered

Situation is closely related to other violence/ copy cat

Cases

Howlers and Hunters

As Scary as it gets

“I would like to burn you at the stake!”

“She said her husband threatened to kill her...”

[illegible]

PRIMARY CLASS	VEHICLE CLASS	STATUS	REPORTING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE & I.D. #	OTHER OFFICERS AT SCENE	
REVIEWED BY:		CASE ASSIGNED TO:	I.D. #	ASSOCIATED INCIDENT 1	ASSOCIATED INCIDENT 2

Staying Prepared

Drills

Role Plays

Threat Assessment and Crisis Teams

References and Resources

Threat Assessment

Hunters and Howlers, Ted Calhoun & Steve Weston

Contemporary Threat Assessment, Ted Calhoun & Steve Weston

Violence Risk & Threat Assessment, J. Reid Meloy, Ph.D.

International Handbook of Threat Assessment, J. Reid Meloy, Ph.D.

Personal Safety

The Gift of Fear, Gavin de Becker

Dangerous Instincts, Mary Ellen O

Predators: Pedophiles, Rapists

Stalking

The Psychology of Stalking, J. Reid Meloy, Ph.D

Violent Attachments, J. Reid Meloy, Ph.D.

The Scientific Pursuit of Stalking, J. Reid Meloy, Ph.D.

Stalking, Threatening & Attacking Public Figures, J. Reid Meloy, Ph.D.

References and Resources

- 1. ASIS / SHRM Workplace Violence Prevention Standard**
- 2. WAVR:** J. Reid Meloy, Ph.D. Available through Specialized Training Services
- 3. RAGE:** Threat Assessment Professionals
- 4. Danger Assessment Domestic / Intimate Partner Abuse Violence Risk Assessment:**
Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Ph.D., RN , Johns Hopkins University
- 5. Threat Triage: Psycholinguistic analysis of threat risk in communicated threats by known or unknown subjects.** Sharon Smith, Ph.D.
- 6. Threat Assessment Group (TAG) Park E. Dietz, M.D. Ph.D.**

Questions, Comments...

References

Calhoun, T. and Weston, R Hunters and Howlers

Hare, R. and Babiak, Snakes In Suits

Hare, R. Without Conscience

O'Toole, M.E. Dangerous Instincts

de Becker, G. Gift of Fear (series)